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Chapter	  1	  Portfolio	  Rebalancing,	  Momentum,	  and	  the	  Earnings	  Season	  	  	  












Lastly,	  I	  link	  the	  timing	  of	  trades	  by	  the	  money	  management	  industry	  to	  the	  variation	  in	  the	  cross	  section	  of	  asset	  returns.	  𝑅𝐷𝑊𝐺𝐻𝑇  strongly	  predicts	  stock	  returns	  throughout	  the	  earnings	  announcement	  season.	  A	  one	  standard	  deviation	  increase	  in	  this	  variable	  implies	  0.52%	  higher	  returns	  in	  the	  underlying	  stock	  during	  the	  dates	  before	  the	  last	  10%	  of	  the	  S&P500	  constituents	  make	  their	  earnings	  announcements	  each	  quarter2.	  A	  value-­‐weighted	  portfolio	  holding	  the	  bottom	  decile	  and	  shorting	  the	  top	  decile	  of	  𝑅𝐷𝑊𝐺𝐻𝑇  large	  cap	  stocks	  earns	  2.83%	  raw	  and	  (2.60%	  adjusted)	  returns	  during	  the	  earnings	  season.	  The	  lowest	  decile	  portfolio	  earned	  an	  average	  of	  0.32%	  return	  while	  the	  highest	  decile	  earned	  3.15%.	  The	  cumulative	  returns	  around	  individual	  firm’s	  quarter	  earnings	  announcements	  indicate	  that	  most	  of	  the	  return	  predictability	  occurs	  during	  and	  after	  the	  release	  of	  earnings	  information	  into	  the	  market.	  This	  predictability	  is	  strong	  even	  after	  adjusting	  for	  contemporaneous	  standardized	  unexpected	  earnings	  (SUE).	  Finally,	  I	  show	  that	  rebalancing	  pressure	  has	  dampened	  momentum	  returns	  between	  January	  1990	  and	  December	  2013.	  The	  12-­‐month	  momentum	  returns	  (UMD)	  are	  increased	  from	  0.35%	  to	  1.49%	  during	  the	  same	  earnings	  sub-­‐period	  each	  quarter	  after	  hedging	  out	  this	  long/short	  portfolio.	  	  	  One	  of	  the	  first	  mentions	  (See	  also	  Tobin	  1958,	  1969)	  of	  the	  channel	  through	  which	  an	  appreciating	  financial	  asset	  drives	  up	  the	  relative	  prices	  of	  other	  securities	  in	  a	  portfolio	  is	  in	  Milton	  Friedman	  and	  Anna	  Schwartz’s	  1963	  magnum	  opus,	  The	  Monetary	  History	  of	  the	  




applied	  to	  the	  cross	  section	  of	  equity	  assets.	  One	  reason	  for	  this	  may	  be	  that	  this	  channel	  is	  difficult	  to	  disentangle	  from	  other	  channels	  of	  asset	  spillover,	  especially	  in	  the	  bond	  market,	  where	  asset	  substitutability	  is	  inherently	  linked	  by	  the	  term	  structure	  of	  expectations	  and	  micro	  portfolio	  level	  data	  is	  scant.	  Another	  reason	  is	  that	  the	  portfolio	  channel	  may	  not	  have	  been	  important	  prior	  to	  the	  growth	  of	  asset	  management	  institutions	  in	  the	  financial	  sector.	  This	  paper	  presents	  evidence	  from	  the	  equity	  markets	  to	  validate	  the	  hypothesis	  that	  preferences	  for	  portfolio	  balancing	  affects	  relative	  prices.	  	  	  This	  paper	  is	  directly	  related	  to	  two	  prior	  studies	  on	  the	  portfolio	  balancing	  by	  investors.	  Calvet,	  Campbell	  and	  Sodini	  (2009)	  study	  the	  household	  rebalancing	  of	  stocks,	  mutual	  funds,	  and	  bonds	  using	  a	  detailed	  comprehensive	  household	  dataset.	  Hau	  and	  Rey	  (2010)	  track	  the	  global	  flow	  from	  portfolios	  of	  a	  set	  of	  international	  mutual	  funds.	  This	  current	  paper	  joins	  them	  in	  documenting	  the	  active	  rebalancing	  of	  portfolios	  by	  investors	  against	  the	  pressures	  of	  cross	  sectional	  price	  changes.	  However,	  distinct	  from	  the	  previous	  studies,	  the	  current	  study	  focuses	  on	  the	  timing	  and	  price	  impact	  of	  this	  behavior.	  I	  find	  pricing	  pressure	  arising	  from	  rebalancing	  trades	  and	  argue	  a	  causal	  link	  between	  the	  portfolio	  balance	  channel	  and	  the	  relative	  returns	  of	  assets.	  	  This	  paper	  is	  also	  related	  to	  the	  seasonal	  effect	  found	  in	  the	  finance	  literature.	  Ritter	  (1988),	  and	  Ritter	  and	  Chopra	  (1989)	  study	  the	  turn	  of	  the	  year	  effects	  in	  which	  low	  capitalization	  stocks	  have	  higher	  returns	  than	  high	  capitalization	  stocks	  during	  the	  January	  of	  each	  year.	  Ritter	  and	  Chopra	  (1989)	  argues	  that	  shifts	  in	  risks	  cannot	  explain	  this	  phenomenon	  and	  that	  portfolio	  rebalancing,	  potentially	  related	  to	  accounting	  incentives,	  is	  the	  most	  consistent	  hypothesis	  for	  this	  effect.	  The	  phenomenon	  reported	  in	  this	  paper	  is	  distinct	  from	  size	  related	  effects	  in	  the	  cross	  section	  of	  asset	  prices.	  In	  fact,	  the	  rebalancing	  pricing	  pressure	  by	  the	  asset	  management	  industry	  exists	  after	  controlling	  for	  size,	  is	  the	  




















scaled	  his	  existing	  holdings	  between	  the	  two	  periods,	  the	  composition	  difference	  in	  the	  portfolio	  would	  be	  entirely	  return	  driven.	  	  	  Let	  fund	  j	  have	  stocks	  {w1,j,t,…,wi,j,t,…,	  wI,j,t	  }.	  For	  each	  component	  in	  a	  portfolio	  j,	  I	  separate	  changes	  in	  the	  weight	  of	  stock	  i	  to	  that	  by	  discretion	  of	  the	  manager	  and	  that	  by	  return	  dispersion.	  	  	   𝑤!,!,!!! − 𝑤!,!,!!"#$%  !!!"#$  (!"#$%!) = 𝑤!,!,!!! − 𝑤!,!,!!!!"#$%&'"()*%+  !!!"#$  (!!"#$%) + 𝑤!,!,!!! − 𝑤!,!,!!"#$%&  !"#$%&  !!!"#$  (!"#$%&)	  	  where	   𝑤!,!,!!! = 𝑤!,!,!!!(1+ 𝑟!,!)𝑤!,!,!(1+ 𝑟!,!)!!!! 	  	  is	  the	  predicted	  weight	  of	  stock	  i	  in	  portfolio	  j	  due	  to	  returns.	  	  The	  variable	  RDWGHTi,j,t	  is	  assigned	  as	  the	  return	  driven	  change	  for	  each	  stock	  i	  in	  portfolio	  
j	  between	  quarters	  t	  to	  t+1.	  Another	  interpretation	  of	  this	  variable	  is	  simply	  the	  interaction	  of	  the	  scaled	  individual	  stock	  return	  and	  its	  weight	  within	  a	  portfolio	  minus	  the	  initial	  weight.	  	  	  I	  regress	  the	  position	  changes,	  RDWGHTi,j,t,	  along	  with	  initial	  weight	  and	  the	  stock’s	  scaled	  return,	  to	  positions	  changes	  at	  t+1	  to	  t+2	  for	  each	  portfolio/quarter	  sample	  collection.	  The	  regression	  coefficients	  are	  collected	  in	  a	  panel	  and	  averaged	  through	  Fama	  Macbeth	  procedure.	  I	  find	  that	  the	  return	  driven	  changes	  are	  negative	  predictors	  of	  discretionary	  weight	  changes	  in	  the	  subsequent	  quarter.	  This	  effect	  is	  complementary	  to	  return	  chasing	  by	  mutual	  fund	  managers.	  Lagged	  quarterly	  returns	  predict	  discretionary	  weight	  increases	  while	  the	  RDWGHTi,j,t	  predicts	  discretionary	  weight	  decreases	  (Table	  2a).	  Overall,	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2.8	  Tables	  and	  Figures:	  	  	  
	  	   Summary	  Statistics	  
	  	   Mean	   Std	   Min	   25	  P.	   Median	   75	  P.	   Max	   N	  
N.	  of	  Account	  Per	  Quarter	   8,550	   14,069	   3,649	   6,748	   8,550	   19,966	   53,510	   44	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
N.	  of	  Trades	  Per	  Account/Qtr	   279	   10,415	   1	   11	   24	   69	   3839056	   697807	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Dollar	  Value	  of	  Buy	  Trade	   161,421	   1,390,599	   0.19	   1,632	   8,470	   50,611	   4,000,000,000	   109,210,492	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Dollar	  Value	  of	  Sell	  Trade	   168,576	   1,357,989	   0.08	   1,494	   8,344	   50,560	   2,406,170,000	   108,250,017	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Total	  Sum	  of	  Quarter's	  Buys	   305	  B	   71	  B	   191	  B	   238	  B	   311	  B	   350	  B	   488	  B	   44	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Total	  Sum	  of	  Quarter's	  Sells	   314	  B	   78	  B	   207	  B	   244	  B	   305	  B	   366	  B	   474	  B	   44	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  





Equal Weighted Coefficients Value Weighted Coefficients 
	  
DDWGHTi,j,t+1 TDWGHTi,j,t+1 DDWGHTi,j,t+1 TDWGHTi,j,t+1 
RDWGHTi,j,t -0.159 -0.224 -0.170 -0.251 -0.114 -0.155 -0.126 -0.179 
 (-16.82) (-15.55) (-8.77) (-10.39) (-8.25) (-8.52) (-5.83) (-6.61) 
 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  WGHTi,j,t 	   -0.124  -0.126  -0.107  -0.108 
 	   (-30.77)  (-27.43)  (-23.48)  (-22.15) 
 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  SRET(1,3) i,j,t 	   0.110  0.125  0.067  0.075 
 	   (7.19)  (6.47)  (5.98)  (5.82) 
 	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Port/Qtr 135292 135292 135292 135292 135292 135292 135292 135292 
Qtr 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 96 	  	  Table	  2a.	  Fama	  Macbeth	  regressions	  of	  discretionary	  changes	  in	  weight	  (DDWGHT)	  against	  lagged	  return	  driven	  change	  in	  weight	  (RDWGHT),	  initial	  weight	  (WGHT),	  and	  3	  month	  returns	  scaled	  by	  total	  holdings	  return	  (SRET).	  The	  first	  stage	  coefficients	  are	  obtained	  by	  regressing	  for	  each	  portfolio/quarter	  subsample,	  requiring	  at	  least	  20	  degrees	  of	  freedom	  per	  regression.	  The	  coefficients	  are	  then	  pooled	  into	  a	  panel	  and	  averaged.	  Columns	  1	  through	  4	  compute	  the	  equal	  weight	  averages,	  whereas	  columns	  5	  through	  8	  compute	  the	  averages	  as	  weighted	  by	  the	  fraction	  of	  the	  fund’s	  value	  to	  the	  total	  mutual	  fund	  value	  for	  that	  quarter.	  The	  standard	  errors	  are	  clustered	  quarterly.	  All	  right	  hand	  side	  regression	  variables	  are	  winsorized	  at	  2.5%	  to	  97.5%	  level	  per	  portfolio/quarter.	  The	  sample	  is	  from	  Q1	  1990	  to	  Q4	  2013.	  	  	  	  
	   	   Net Increase in Prop Held by Mutual Funds at t+1 
 Weighted Least Squares 
 1990 to 2013 1990 to 1999 2000 to 2013 
,i tRDWGHT  -0.001 0.000 -0.001 
 (-6.37) (-2.97) (-5.87) 
WGHT i ,t  -0.061 -0.062 -0.061 
 (-3.32) (-2.16) (-2.49) 
,(1,3)i tRET  0.008 0.010 0.007 
 (7.12) (5.33) (4.81) 
 	   	   	  




	  	   S&P	  500	  Trade	  Intensity	  by	  Money	  Managers	  
	  	   2000 to 2010 2000 to 2005 2006 to 2010 
	  	   Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Average Start of Quarter Relative 
Adjusted Volume 0.359 0.360 0.364 0.362 0.354 0.358 
 
      
Average Rest of Quarter Relative 
Adjusted Volume 0.321 0.320 0.318 0.319 0.323 0.321 
 
      
Diff 0.038 0.040 0.046 0.043 0.031 0.037 
 
(6.48) (7.02) (5.92) (6.02) (3.24) (3.96) 
 	   	   	   	   	   	  
Number of Start of Quarter Months 44 44 24 24 20 20 
Number of Rest of Quarter Months 88 88 48 48 40 40 	  Table	  3a.	  This	  table	  presents	  the	  fraction	  of	  each	  quarter’s	  buy	  and	  sells	  (share	  traded	  multiplied	  by	  last	  quarter	  prices)	  in	  the	  months	  at	  the	  start	  of	  the	  quarter	  versus	  the	  months	  in	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  quarter.	  The	  average	  January,	  April,	  July,	  and	  October	  relative	  trades	  are	  reported	  in	  the	  top	  row,	  while	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  quarter	  months’	  relative	  trades	  are	  reported	  in	  the	  second	  row.	  The	  pooled	  t-­‐score	  for	  the	  difference	  in	  fractions	  is	  reported.	  	  	  
	  	   Fraction	  Buy/Sell	  versus	  Aggregate	  S&P	  Volume	  in	  Start	  of	  Qtr	  
	  	   2000 to 2010 2000 to 2005 2006 to 2010 
	  	   Sell Buy Sell Buy Sell Buy 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Relative Money Manager 
Sells/Buys in 0.359 0.360 0.364 0.362 0.354 0.358 
     	    Relative S&P Volume 0.348 0.348 0.351 0.351 0.344 0.344 
       Diff 0.011 0.013 0.013 0.011 0.010 0.014 
 
(3.59) (4.59) (3.96) (3.64) (1.65) (2.99) 
 	   	   	   	   	   	  Number of Start of Quarter 






Weight LS Weighted Logit 
	  
Net Buyi,t+1 
,i tRDWGHT  -0.035 -0.076 -0.072 -0.165 
 (-2.38) (-3.31) (-2.37) (-3.29) 
 	   	   	   	  
,i tWGHT  	   -5.936 	   -12.462 
 	   (-3.12) 	   (-3.11) 
 	   	   	   	  
,(1,3)i tRET  	   0.365 	   0.796 
 	   (3.04) 	   (3.08) 
 





Top Size Quintile Correlation 
	  
4th Size Quintile Correlation 
	  	   RDWGHT Ret(1,3) Ret(4,6) Ret(7,12) 
	  
	  	   RDWGHT Ret(1,3) Ret(4,6) Ret(7,12) 
RDWGHT 1.000    
	  
RDWGHT 1.000    
     
	  
     
Ret(1,3) 0.755 1.000   
	  
Ret(1,3) 0.767 1.000   
     
	  
     
Ret(4,6) 0.020 0.044 1.000  
	  
Ret(4,6) -0.002 0.000 1.000  
     
	  
     
Ret(7,12) 0.032 0.080 0.040 1.000 
	  
Ret(7,12) 0.029 0.069 0.028 1.000 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  3rd Size Quintile Correlation 
	  
2nd Size Quintile Correlation 
	  	   RDWGHT Ret(1,3) Ret(4,6) Ret(7,12) 
	  
	  	   RDWGHT Ret(1,3) Ret(4,6) Ret(7,12) 
RDWGHT 1.000    
	  
RDWGHT 1.000    
     
	  
     
Ret(1,3) 0.755 1.000   
	  
Ret(1,3) 0.737 1.000   
     
	  
     
Ret(4,6) 0.004 -0.002 1.000  
	  
Ret(4,6) 0.000 -0.019 1.000  
     
	  
     
Ret(7,12) 0.018 0.076 0.029 1.000 
	  
Ret(7,12) 0.023 0.075 0.036 1.000 




	   	  Bottom Size Quintile Correlation 
	   	   	   	   	   	  
	  	   RDWGHT Ret(1,3) Ret(4,6) Ret(7,12) 
	   	  
    
RDWGHT 1.000    
	   	   	   	   	   	  
     
	   	   	   	   	   	  Ret(1,3) 0.573 1.000   
	   	   	   	   	   	  
     
	   	   	   	   	   	  Ret(4,6) 0.018 -0.003 1.000  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
     
	   	   	   	   	   	  Ret(7,12) 0.027 0.075 0.089 1.000 






Intra Quarter Return at t+1 
,i tRDWGHT  -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 (-3.36) (-2.79) (-3.72) 
,i tWGHT   -0.202 -0.284   (-0.67) (-1.62) 
,(1,3)i tRET   -0.013 -0.006   (-0.59) (-0.33) 
,(4,6)i tRET    -0.015    (-1.23) 
RET (7,12)i ,t    0.006    (0.78) 
,i tBM    (-0.00)    (-0.22) 
,i tIdioVol    -0.106    (-0.35) 
,i tInstOwn    0.009    (1.42) 
,i tLogMktCap   0.002 
   (1.54) 




	   	   Cumulative	  Returns	  Around	  Earnings	  Announcement	  Date	  
	  
Ret(-10,-3) Ret(-2,2) Ret(3,10) 
,i tRDWGHT  0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
 (-0.34) (-0.10) (-1.89) (-3.17) (-3.36) (-3.73) 
SUEi ,t   0.063  0.211  0.064   (3.89)  (11.51)  (3.86) 
,i tBM   0.001  -0.001  -0.002   (0.67)  (-0.91)  (-1.21) 
,i tIdioVol   0.320  -0.114  -0.141   (2.97)  (-1.28)  (-1.34) 
,i tInstOwn   0.001  0.008  0.000   (0.30)  (3.16)  (-0.15) 
,i tLogMktCap   0.001  -0.001  0.000   (1.95)  (-1.64)  (-0.98)  
	   	   	   	   	   	  Qtrs 96 96 96 96 96 96 	  Table	  6b.	  Fama	  Macbeth	  regressions	  on	  cumulative	  returns	  around	  the	  earnings	  announcement	  dates.	  




	  	   	  RDWGHT	  Returns	  	  	   LS (D - U) 	   Raw	   3	  Factors	  Adjusted	   4	  Factors	  Adjusted	  	  	   1990-­‐2013	   2000-­‐2013	   1990-­‐2013	   2000-­‐2013	   1990-­‐2013	   2000-­‐2013	  
Size	  1	   0.001 0.005 -0.004 0.002 -0.003 -0.002 	   (0.09) (0.48) (-0.67) (0.26) (-0.45) (-0.19) 
Size	  2	   0.014 0.021 0.008 0.017 0.010 0.012 	   (1.70) (1.55) (1.02) (1.48) (1.50) (1.27) 
Size	  3	   0.017 0.026 0.008 0.022 0.011 0.015 	   (1.55) (1.46) (0.76) (1.40) (1.33) (1.18) 
Size	  4	   0.021 0.027 0.011 0.022 0.014 0.015 	   (1.84) (1.49) (1.08) (1.43) (1.72) (1.22) 
Size	  5	   0.028 0.039 0.024 0.036 0.026 0.033 
	  	   (3.80) (3.53) (3.31) (3.62) (4.20) (3.61) 	  Table	  7a.	  Long	  short	  raw	  and	  adjusted	  returns	  from	  portfolios	  sorted	  on	  size	  and	  RDWGHT	  (the	  average	  past	  quarter	  return	  driven	  weight	  change	  cross	  all	  mutual	  funds	  for	  each	  stock).	  The	  Long	  Short	  portfolio	  is	  calculated	  using	  the	  lowest	  decile	  (D)	  of	  RDWGHT	  minus	  the	  highest	  decile	  (U)	  of	  RDWGHT.	  Market	  cap	  values	  and	  the	  size	  breakpoints	  are	  from	  the	  end	  of	  last	  June.	  The	  size	  breakpoints	  follow	  the	  Fama	  and	  French	  and	  uses	  percentile	  cutoff	  values	  from	  the	  NYSE	  stock	  exchange.	  	  
	  	   Raw	  RDWGHT	  Returns	  	  	   LS (D - U) 	   Q1	   Q2	   Q3	   Q4	  	  	   1990-­‐2013	   2000-­‐2013	   1990-­‐2013	   2000-­‐2013	   1990-­‐2013	   2000-­‐2013	   1990-­‐2013	   2000-­‐2013	  
Size	  1	   0.008 -0.001 0.008 0.024 -0.011 -0.007 -0.003 0.004 	   (0.48) (-0.05) (0.74) (1.45) (-1.33) (-0.59) (-0.17) (0.16) 
Size	  2	   0.012 0.004 0.018 0.034 0.004 0.012 0.024 0.033 	   (0.73) (0.16) (1.15) (1.35) (0.40) (0.80) (1.00) (0.86) 
Size	  3	   -0.012 -0.018 0.043 0.077 0.002 0.004 0.035 0.043 	   (-0.82) (-0.82) (1.54) (1.67) (0.17) (0.19) (1.33) (0.96) 
Size	  4	   -0.008 -0.022 0.041 0.062 0.013 0.020 0.038 0.047 	   (-0.52) (-0.89) (1.56) (1.39) (0.90) (1.01) (1.27) (1.01) 
Size	  5	   0.015 0.019 0.040 0.066 0.029 0.040 0.030 0.032 





Intra Quarter UMD Return at t 
Intercept -0.003 0.003 0.015 
 (-0.46) (0.53) (2.54) 
,i tMktrf   -0.527 -0.346 
  (-5.25) (-3.81) 
,i tSMB   0.013 0.054 
  (0.09) (0.42) 
,i tHML   -0.291 -0.204 
  (-2.09) (-1.71) 
LMWi ,t    -0.479 
   (-5.98) 






	  	  	  Figure	  1.	  The	  seasonal	  pattern	  of	  Asset	  Managers	  trades.	  Panel	  A	  plots	  the	  relative	  fraction	  of	  each	  month	  over	  each	  quarter’s	  total	  buys	  from	  the	  Ancerno	  database.	  Panel	  B	  plot	  the	  relative	  fraction	  of	  each	  month	  over	  each	  quarter’s	  total	  sells.	  Panel	  C	  plots	  the	  same	  account	  from	  the	  aggregate	  S&P	  500	  volume.	  Panel	  D	  plots	  the	  fraction	  of	  each	  month’s	  net	  un-­‐cancelled	  buys	  and	  sells	  over	  quarter.	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2.9	  Appendix	  Tables	  and	  Figures:	  	  
	  	   Momentum	  (2	  to	  12	  Month	  Returns)	  
	  
LS (U - D) 
	  
1st	  of	  Quarter	   Ignoring	  Jan	   Rest	  of	  Quarter	  
	  	   1990-­‐2013	   2000-­‐2013	   1990-­‐2013	   2000-­‐2013	   1990-­‐2013	   2000-­‐2013	  
Size	  1	   -0.008 -0.015 0.006 -0.004 0.016 0.009 
	  
(-0.90) (-1.14) (0.75) (-0.31) (3.80) (1.34) 
Size	  2	   -0.003 -0.014 0.000 -0.013 0.012 0.007 
	  
(-0.43) (-1.07) (-0.01) (-0.86) (2.85) (1.19) 
Size	  3	   -0.006 -0.016 -0.004 -0.015 0.011 0.010 
	  
(-0.73) (-1.38) (-0.49) (-1.14) (2.60) (1.56) 
Size	  4	   -0.008 -0.017 -0.005 -0.015 0.013 0.014 
	  
(-0.96) (-1.40) (-0.52) (-1.06) (2.74) (1.87) 
Size	  5	   -0.011 -0.027 -0.005 -0.019 0.013 0.018 
	  	   (-1.39) (-2.47) (-0.59) (-1.67) (2.98) (2.78) Table	  A1a.	  Momentum	  portfolio	  returns	  (25	  portfolios)	  sorted	  by	  size.	  Each	  long	  short	  portfolio	  is	  calculated	  using	  the	  top	  quintile	  (U)	  return	  minus	  the	  bottom	  quintile	  (D)	  return.	  	  	  
	  	   Reversal	  (1	  Month	  Returns)	  
	  
LS (D - U) 
	  
1st	  of	  Quarter	   Ignoring	  Jan	   Rest	  of	  Quarter	  
	  	   1990-­‐2013	   2000-­‐2013	   1990-­‐2013	   2000-­‐2013	   1990-­‐2013	   2000-­‐2013	  
Size	  1	   0.022 0.024 0.008 0.011 -0.005 -0.005 
	  
(3.27) (2.33) (1.33) (1.24) (-1.56) (-0.97) 
Size	  2	   0.015 0.020 0.010 0.014 -0.001 -0.003 
	  
(2.73) (2.31) (1.56) (1.51) (-0.44) (-0.60) 
Size	  3	   0.016 0.018 0.012 0.014 -0.003 -0.004 
	  
(3.01) (2.26) (1.95) (1.52) (-0.82) (-0.81) 
Size	  4	   0.008 0.015 0.003 0.007 -0.003 -0.006 
	  
(1.43) (1.78) (0.47) (0.74) (-0.83) (-1.07) 
Size	  5	   0.013 0.023 0.009 0.019 -0.004 -0.005 




	  	   Momentum	  (2	  to	  12	  Month	  Returns)	  
	  
LS (U - D) 
	  
1st	  of	  Quarter	   Ignoring	  Jan	   Rest	  of	  Quarter	  
	  	   1970-­‐1990	   1950-­‐1970	   1970-­‐1990	   1950-­‐1970	   1970-­‐1990	   1950-­‐1970	  
Size	  1	   0.004 0.000 0.023 0.016 0.023 0.015 
	  
(0.57) (-0.06) (4.54) (3.42) (7.20) (5.50) 
Size	  2	   0.012 0.008 0.022 0.019 0.016 0.012 
	  
(2.17) (1.64) (3.98) (4.34) (5.24) (4.75) 
Size	  3	   0.013 0.011 0.019 0.019 0.013 0.012 
	  
(2.34) (2.55) (3.07) (3.92) (3.84) (4.60) 
Size	  4	   0.006 0.008 0.014 0.014 0.013 0.013 
	  
(0.98) (1.67) (2.09) (2.69) (3.72) (5.25) 
Size	  5	   0.006 0.006 0.009 0.012 0.008 0.011 
	  	   (0.93) (1.38) (1.30) (2.26) (1.84) (4.25) 	  Table	  A2a.	  Momentum	  portfolio	  returns	  (25	  portfolios)	  sorted	  by	  size	  at	  other	  holding	  periods.	  Each	  long	  short	  portfolio	  is	  calculated	  using	  the	  top	  quintile	  (U)	  return	  minus	  the	  bottom	  quintile	  (D)	  return.	  	  	  
	  	   Reversal	  (1	  Month	  Returns)	  
	  
LS (U - D) 
	  
1st	  of	  Quarter	   Ignoring	  Jan	   Rest	  of	  Quarter	  
	  
1970-­‐1990	   1950-­‐1970	   1970-­‐1990	   1950-­‐1970	   1970-­‐1990	   1950-­‐1970	  
Size	  1	   0.025 0.022 0.007 0.005 0.004 0.009 
	  
(4.21) (4.76) (1.52) (1.41) (1.71) (4.62) 
Size	  2	   0.018 0.012 0.010 0.002 0.008 0.006 
	  
(3.75) (3.58) (2.11) (0.68) (3.12) (3.00) 
Size	  3	   0.014 0.010 0.011 0.005 0.009 0.008 
	  
(3.37) (3.56) (2.34) (1.43) (3.82) (3.97) 
Size	  4	   0.011 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.010 0.009 
	  
(2.59) (3.12) (1.78) (1.13) (3.79) (4.98) 
Size	  5	   -0.003 0.004 -0.005 0.000 0.005 0.006 




Chapter	  2	  Mutual	  Fund	  Impact	  From	  Distribution	  Flows	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2.7	  Figures	  &	  Tables:	  
	  
	  	  Figure	  1.	  The	  figures	  above	  are	  event	  study	  graphs	  of	  the	  valued-­‐weighted	  market	  returns	  around	  the	  distribution	  dates	  (both	  capital	  gains	  and	  dividends)	  of	  4	  of	  the	  current	  largest	  open-­‐ended	  mutual	  funds.	  The	  solid	  lines	  are	  the	  cumulative	  returns	  around	  the	  distribution	  dates,	  while	  the	  dashed	  blue	  lines	  are	  the	  95%	  confidence	  interval.	  Market	  returns	  of	  5	  days	  before	  the	  events	  are	  compared	  to	  those	  of	  5	  days	  after	  in	  the	  boxes	  on	  the	  lower	  right	  hand	  corner.	  For	  example,	  daily	  market	  returns	  in	  the	  5	  days	  after	  a	  Fidelity	  Contrafund	  distribution	  event	  are	  on	  average	  18	  basis	  points	  higher	  than	  in	  the	  5	  days	  before.	  The	  sample	  runs	  from	  January	  1980	  to	  2013.	  Funds	  within	  the	  same	  mutual	  fund	  institution	  tend	  to	  have	  similar	  distribution	  dates,	  so	  Vanguard	  Total	  Stock	  Market	  fund	  has	  a	  similar	  pattern	  to	  the	  Vanguard	  500	  plotted	  above.	  	   	  











































































	  Figure	  3a.	  Total	  equity	  fund	  distributions	  in	  2013	  according	  to	  the	  CRSP	  Mutual	  Fund	  database.	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   2000	   2001	   2002	   2003	   2004	   2005	   2006	   2007	   2008	   2009	   2010	   2011	   2012	   2013	  




	  	   Summary	  Statistics	  
	  	   Mean	   Std	   Min	   25	  P.	   Median	   75	  P.	   Max	   N	  
N.	  of	  Equity	  Fund	  Per	  Year	   4499	   4385	   140	   217	   3919	   8199	   14796	   34	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
N.	  of	  Events	  Per	  Year	   7899	   7132	   240	   329	   8113	   14405	   20010	   34	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Fund	  Size	  (Year/Fund	  Obs	  in	  M.)	   350	   1817	   0.001	   5.1	   35.2	   178	   105938	   150632	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Daily	  Distribution	  Size	  (M.)	   258	   1496	   0	   0	   3.76	   45.3	   72871	   8577	  
	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Number	  of	  Stocks	  Held	  
(Event/Portfolio	  Obs)	   135	   214	   31	   50	   74	   119	   3102	   74285	  





	  	   VW Market Return 
	  	   1980 to 2013 1990 to 2013 2000 to 2013 
Intercept 0.6400 0.5600 0.2500 
  (2.49) (1.97) (0.68) 
     
ScaledDistr 0.0500 0.0500 0.0400 
  (2.50) (2.51) (1.72) 
  
   Monthly Fixed YES YES YES 
	  	  




	  	   VW Market Return 
	  	   1980 to 2013 1990 to 2013 2000 to 2013 
Intercept 0.0210 0.0130 -0.0070 
  (1.47) (0.76) (-0.30) 
     
EventDum 0.0910 0.1040 0.1320 
  (3.60) (3.21) (2.57) 
  
   R^2 0.0014 0.0015 0.0016 
	  	   EW Market Return 
	  
1980 to 2013 1990 to 2013 2000 to 2013 
Intercept 0.0580 0.0630 0.0280 
  (4.97) (4.33) (1.28) 
     
EventDum 0.0870 0.1010 0.1530 
  (4.16) (3.70) (3.40) 
  
   R^2 0.0019 0.0021 0.0029 
	  	   S&P 500 Return 
	  
1980 to 2013 1990 to 2013 2000 to 2013 
Intercept 0.0130 0.0060 -0.0160 
  (0.90) (0.35) (-0.62) 
     
EventDum 0.0840 0.0980 0.1230 
  (3.20) (2.98) (2.41) 
  





	  	   VW Market Return 
	  	   1980 to 2013 2000 to 2013 
Intercept 0.0204 0.0123 -0.0090 -0.0156 -0.0291 -0.0472 
  (1.40) (0.84) (-0.56) (-0.58) (-1.07) (-1.58) 
        EventDum 0.0927 0.0907 0.0791 0.1628 0.1643 0.1551 
  (3.42) (3.34) (2.89) (2.73) (2.76) (2.60) 
  
      FOMC 






        Turn of 
Month 
  
0.0874   0.0719 
    (3.34)   
(1.45) 
  
	   	   	   	   	   	  Month 
Fixed YES YES YES YES YES YES 
  




	  	   5 Days 10 Days 15 Days 
	  




	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  
Smallest Size 0.0058 0.0088 0.0030 0.0105 0.0140 0.0035 0.0143 0.0181 -0.0002 
 




	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  
2 0.0052 0.0078 0.0026 0.0096 0.0126 0.0031 0.0147 0.0162 -0.0005 
 




	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  
3 0.0049 0.0074 0.0025 0.0092 0.0120 0.0028 0.0159 0.0153 -0.0006 
 




	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  
4 0.0045 0.0073 0.0028 0.0083 0.0117 0.0034 0.0167 0.0148 0.0001 
 




    
 
    
 
  
Biggest Size 0.0041 0.0066 0.0026 0.0080 0.0105 0.0025 0.0183 0.0128 -0.0016 
	  




	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  
Difference 	  	  
	  




(0.62)   
 






	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  





	  	   5 Days 10 Days 15 Days 
	  




	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  
Lowest Weight 0.0052 0.0085 0.0032 0.0098 0.0140 0.0042 0.0174 0.0180 0.0006 
 
(3.34) (3.75) (2.26) (3.21) (3.64) (1.51) (2.80) (3.96) (0.10) 
 
	  	  
	   	  
	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  
2 0.0050 0.0079 0.0028 0.0093 0.0127 0.0034 0.0164 0.0164 -0.0001 
 




	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  
3 0.0047 0.0074 0.0026 0.0089 0.0120 0.0031 0.0157 0.0152 -0.0005 
 




	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  
4 0.0048 0.0072 0.0024 0.0088 0.0115 0.0026 0.0153 0.0145 -0.0008 
 




	  	     
 
    
 
  
High Weight 0.0047 0.0069 0.0022 0.0088 0.0106 0.0018 0.0150 0.0131 -0.0019 
	  




	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  
Difference 	  	  
	  




(1.54)   
 






	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  




	  	   5 Days 10 Days 15 Days 
	  




	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  
Highest Loss 0.0042 0.0083 0.0041 0.0079 0.0146 0.0066 0.0150 0.0181 0.0031 
 




	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  
2 0.0047 0.0079 0.0032 0.0089 0.0135 0.0046 0.0158 0.0167 0.0009 
 




	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  
3 0.0048 0.0072 0.0024 0.0089 0.0119 0.0029 0.0157 0.0148 -0.0009 
 




	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  
4 0.0049 0.0069 0.0020 0.0093 0.0109 0.0016 0.0158 0.0135 -0.0022 
 




    
 
    
 
  
Highest Gain 0.0050 0.0067 0.0017 0.0096 0.0103 0.0008 0.0159 0.0124 -0.0035 
	  




	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  
Difference 	  	  
	  
0.0024 	  	  
	  






(2.18) 	  	  
	  






	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	   	  	  
	  
	  	  




Chapter	  3	  Industry	  Window	  Dressing	  	  
3.1	  Introduction:	  
	   Investors	  are	  continuously	  faced	  with	  a	  large	  number	  of	  potential	  signals	  that	  are	  available	  to	  collect	  and	  process.	  Faced	  with	  these,	  investors	  need	  to	  solve	  the	  complex	  time	  allocation	  problem	  with	  respect	  to	  selecting	  an	  processing	  each	  potential	  signal.	  If	  investors	  specialized	  in	  collecting	  disjoint	  signals,	  the	  processing	  constraints	  of	  each	  disparate	  investor	  would	  not	  matter	  for	  aggregate	  prices,	  as	  prices	  would	  reflect	  the	  sum	  of	  their	  investment	  capacity.	  If,	  however,	  investors	  take	  correlated	  shortcuts	  in	  their	  investing,	  then	  simple	  pieces	  of	  information	  can	  remain	  systematically	  unreflected	  in	  firm	  prices.	  Moreover,	  if	  firm	  managers	  are	  aware	  of	  these	  shortcuts	  and	  their	  implications,	  managers	  may	  take	  specific	  actions	  to	  exploit	  these	  investment	  shortcuts.	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  identify	  one	  such	  shortcut	  that	  financial	  agents	  take	  and	  document	  how	  it	  affects	  both	  prices	  and	  resulting	  managerial	  behavior.	  Specifically,	  we	  examine	  the	  primary	  industry	  into	  which	  each	  firm	  is	  classified.	  The	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission	  (SEC),	  in	  classifying	  firm	  operations,	  designates	  that	  each	  firm	  have	  a	  primary	  industry,	  which	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  segment	  with	  the	  highest	  percentage	  of	  sales.5	  Using	  this	  rule,	  we	  exploit	  situations	  in	  which	  firms	  tightly	  surround	  the	  discontinuity	  point	  of	  industry	  classification.	  For	  example,	  a	  firm	  that	  gets	  51%	  of	  its	  sales	  from	  technology	  and	  49%	  of	  sales	  from	  lumber	  is	  classified	  as	  a	  technology	  firm,	  whereas	  a	  firm	  with	  nearly	  








jump	  in	  sell-­‐side	  analyst	  coverage	  at	  the	  industry	  classification	  discontinuity.	  In	  particular,	  firms	  right	  above	  the	  discontinuity	  have	  significantly	  more	  coverage	  from	  the	  classification	  industry	  than	  nearly	  identical	  firms	  just	  below	  the	  cutoff;	  they	  have	  a	  50%	  (t	  =	  2.27)	  higher	  fraction	  of	  analysts	  from	  the	  classification	  industry	  covering	  them.	  Again,	  we	  see	  no	  similar	  jumps	  in	  coverage	  percentage	  anywhere	  else	  in	  the	  distribution.	  Although	  these	  results	  on	  both	  analyst	  and	  mutual	  fund	  manager	  behavior	  are	  consistent	  with	  correlated	  shortcuts,	  they	  could	  also	  be	  driven	  by	  institutional	  constraints.	  	  	  We	  next	  explore	  how	  managers	  may	  take	  advantage	  of	  these	  investor	  shortcuts.	  In	  particular,	  we	  examine	  the	  actions	  managers	  can	  take	  to	  fool	  investors	  into	  thinking	  that	  they	  are	  part	  of	  an	  industry.	  To	  do	  this,	  we	  identify	  situations	  in	  which	  it	  would	  be	  advantageous	  to	  be	  considered	  part	  of	  a	  given	  industry	  (relative	  to	  other	  industries).	  For	  this	  purpose,	  we	  use	  periods	  in	  which	  certain	  industries	  have	  higher	  valuation	  (that	  is,	  lower	  cost	  of	  capital)	  than	  others.	  We	  measure	  industry	  valuation	  in	  several	  ways:	  a	  proxy	  for	  investor	  preferences	  and	  beliefs	  based	  on	  capital	  flows	  into	  mutual	  funds	  investing	  in	  given	  industries,	  and	  an	  industry	  B/M	  measure;	  both	  produce	  identical	  results.	  Importantly,	  this	  higher	  valuation	  need	  not	  be	  misvaluation	  (for	  instance,	  it	  could	  represent	  increased	  future	  growth	  options).6	  Firms	  in	  these	  higher-­‐valuation	  industries:	  (a)	  enjoy	  higher	  announcement	  day	  returns	  around	  being	  classified	  into	  those	  highly	  valued	  industries;	  (b)	  engage	  in	  significantly	  more	  equity	  issuance	  at	  the	  higher	  valuation;	  and	  (c)	  engage	  in	  more	  stock-­‐financed	  M&A	  activities.	  	  To	  capture	  managerial	  behavior	  precisely	  to	  gain	  this	  favorable	  industry	  classification,	  we	  again	  exploit	  the	  discontinuity	  of	  industry	  classification.	  In	  particular,	  we	  focus	  on	  firms	  that	  cluster	  tightly	  around	  this	  discontinuity	  point	  precisely	  when	  valuation	  of	  one	  of	  its	  industry	  segments	  is	  particularly	  high	  relative	  to	  the	  other	  segment.	  Specifically,	  we	  examine	  how	  managers	  industry	  window	  dress	  their	  firms	  at	  times	  when	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  








































3.4	  Investment	  Shortcuts:	  	  The	  main	  thesis	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  that	  investors	  take	  correlated	  shortcuts	  that	  cause	  simple	  pieces	  of	  information	  to	  be	  systematically	  unreflected	  in	  firm	  prices.	  We	  then	  test	  whether	  managers	  are	  aware	  of	  these	  shortcuts	  and	  then	  act	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  the	  shortcuts’	  implications.	  In	  this	  section	  we	  focus	  on	  one	  shortcut	  that	  financial	  agents	  take	  –	  a	  firm’s	  primary	  industry	  classification	  versus	  its	  actual	  fundamental	  operations	  –	  and	  document	  how	  it	  affects	  both	  financial	  agent	  behavior	  and	  prices.	  	  	  
3.4.1	  Shortcuts	  and	  Betas:	  




calculating	  the	  corresponding	  industry	  returns	  to	  avoid	  any	  mechanical	  correlation.	  Finally,	  we	  control	  for	  known	  common	  risk	  factors,	  such	  as	  market,	  size,	  value,	  and	  momentum	  factors,	  in	  our	  regression	  specification.	  If	  investors	  have	  no	  processing	  constraints	  in	  assessing	  the	  details	  of	  firm	  operations	  in	  different	  segments,	  we	  expect	  to	  see	  a	  gradual	  increase	  in	  industry	  beta	  as	  we	  move	  from	  bins	  of	  lower	  fractional	  sales	  to	  bins	  of	  higher	  fractional	  sales.	  The	  results,	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  II,	  indicate	  otherwise.	  While	  the	  industry	  beta	  generally	  increases	  as	  we	  move	  from	  the	  bottom	  bin	  to	  the	  top	  bin,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  structural	  break	  at	  the	  50%	  point.	  The	  average	  industry	  beta	  for	  firms	  in	  the	  50%–55%	  bin,	  after	  controlling	  for	  known	  risk	  factors,	  is	  0.286,	  whereas	  that	  in	  the	  45%–50%	  bin	  is	  0.178.	  The	  difference	  of	  0.107,	  representing	  a	  61%	  increase,	  is	  highly	  statistically	  significant	  (t	  =	  4.91).	  The	  difference	  in	  industry	  beta	  between	  any	  of	  the	  other	  two	  bins	  is	  statistically	  zero.	  The	  structural	  break	  can	  be	  seen	  more	  easily	  in	  a	  diagram.	  As	  shown	  in	  the	  top	  left	  panel	  of	  Figure	  1,	  while	  there	  is	  a	  mildly	  increasing	  trend	  in	  industry	  beta	  in	  both	  the	  below-­‐50%	  and	  above-­‐50%	  regions,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  jump	  in	  industry	  beta	  at	  the	  50%	  point.	  	  
3.4.2	  Sector	  Mutual	  Funds:	  	  
	   To	  provide	  evidence	  of	  this	  behavior	  by	  a	  set	  of	  (arguably)	  sophisticated	  investors,	  we	  examine	  mutual	  fund	  managers’	  holdings.	  We	  first	  identify	  those	  mutual	  funds	  that	  concentrate	  on	  a	  specific	  sector.	  As	  very	  few	  mutual	  funds	  list	  their	  sector	  in	  their	  fund	  name,	  we	  examine	  the	  actual	  fund	  holdings.	  If	  a	  fund	  invests	  the	  majority	  of	  its	  portfolio	  in	  a	  single	  industry	  (i.e.,	  >50%),	  either	  by	  choice	  or	  through	  institutional	  constraints,	  we	  classify	  the	  mutual	  fund	  as	  concentrating	  on	  that	  given	  sector.10	  For	  every	  two-­‐segment	  conglomerate	  firm,	  we	  then	  count	  the	  number	  of	  sector	  mutual	  funds	  that	  hold	  the	  firm	  in	  months	  6	  to	  18	  after	  the	  fiscal	  year	  end.	  We	  further	  require	  that	  the	  two	  segments	  be	  in	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  








3.4.3	  Analyst	  Coverage:	  




from	  the	  industry	  in	  question,	  32.7%	  of	  the	  analysts	  covering	  these	  firms	  are	  from	  that	  industry;	  in	  contrast,	  for	  firms	  that	  derive	  50–55%	  of	  their	  sales	  from	  the	  industry	  in	  question,	  52.0%	  of	  these	  analysts	  are	  from	  that	  industry.11	  The	  difference	  in	  analyst	  coverage	  of	  19.3%,	  representing	  an	  almost	  60%	  increase	  from	  the	  lower	  bin,	  is	  economically	  and	  statistically	  significant	  (t	  =	  2.27).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  difference	  between	  any	  other	  two	  bins	  is	  much	  smaller	  in	  magnitude	  and	  statistically	  insignificant	  from	  zero.	  This	  pattern	  can	  be	  also	  seen	  from	  the	  bottom	  right	  panel	  of	  Figure	  1,	  where	  we	  plot	  the	  proportion	  of	  analysts	  covering	  the	  firm	  from	  a	  particular	  industry	  against	  the	  segment	  percentage	  sales.	  There	  is	  a	  discrete	  jump	  in	  analyst	  coverage	  at	  the	  50%	  cutoff	  point.	   	  In	  sum,	  the	  results	  presented	  in	  this	  section	  provide	  evidence	  that	  investors	  take	  shortcuts,	  relying	  on	  firms’	  primary	  industry	  classification,	  in	  some	  cases	  more	  so	  than	  actual	  firm	  operations.	  This	  may	  arise	  from	  investors’	  limited	  attention	  or	  processing	  capacity	  to	  read	  through	  all	  segment-­‐related	  information,	  forcing	  them	  to	  rely	  on	  simple	  statistics,	  from	  investors’	  reliance	  on	  analysts’	  guidance	  (who	  in	  turn	  use	  industry	  classifications	  to	  determine	  the	  stocks	  they	  follow),	  or	  from	  institutional	  constraints	  on	  holdings.	  	  
	   	  




3.5	  Industry	  Window	  Dressing:	  
	  
3.5.1	  Favorable	  Industries:	  




reverses.12	  We	  label	  these	  high	  valuation	  industries	  (top	  20	  as	  ranked	  by	  industry	  𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊)	  “favorable”	  industries.13	  	  Using	  this	  favorable	  industry	  measure,	  we	  show	  that	  firms	  in	  these	  industries	  are	  afforded	  a	  number	  of	  benefits.	  In	  Table	  IV,	  Panel	  B	  we	  show	  that	  these	  firms	  engage	  in	  significantly	  more	  equity	  issuance	  at	  the	  higher	  industry	  valuation	  levels.	  The	  coefficient	  in	  Column	  2	  of	  1.451	  (z	  =	  4.09)	  implies	  that	  a	  one	  standard	  deviation	  increase	  in	  investment	  flows	  into	  an	  industry	  increases	  the	  SEO	  likelihood	  by	  roughly	  20%	  (from	  a	  baseline	  of	  9.7%).	  In	  addition,	  they	  engage	  in	  significantly	  more	  M&A	  activity.	  Consistent	  with	  the	  firms	  exploiting	  the	  higher	  industry	  valuations,	  the	  increase	  in	  M&A	  activity	  comes	  solely	  through	  stock-­‐financed	  M&As.	  The	  coefficient	  in	  Column	  4	  of	  3.133	  (z	  =	  3.25)	  implies	  that	  a	  one	  standard	  deviation	  increase	  in	  investment	  flows	  into	  an	  industry	  increases	  the	  stock-­‐financed	  M&A	  likelihood	  by	  roughly	  26%	  (from	  a	  baseline	  of	  1.1%).	  	  
3.5.2	  Identification	  of	  Industry	  Window	  Dressing:	  
	   An	  innovation	  of	  the	  paper	  relative	  to	  the	  existing	  literature	  is	  the	  clean	  identification	  of	  firm	  behavior	  in	  direct	  response	  to	  this	  mispricing.	  In	  particular,	  we	  exploit	  a	  rule	  of	  the	  Securities	  and	  Exchange	  Commission	  (SEC)	  that	  designates	  how	  firms	  classify	  their	  operations.	  Using	  this	  rule,	  we	  exploit	  situations	  in	  which	  firms	  tightly	  surround	  the	  discontinuity	  point	  of	  industry	  classification	  (e.g.,	  for	  two	  segment	  firms,	  this	  would	  be	  50%).	  	  	  By	  examining	  the	  distribution	  of	  conglomerate	  firms	  right	  around	  this	  discontinuity,	  we	  can	  focus	  cleanly	  on	  how	  the	  incentive	  for	  managers	  to	  join	  favorable	  industries	  relates	  












Table	  V,	  Panel	  A,	  shows	  the	  entire	  distribution	  of	  conglomerate	  firms	  that	  operate	  in	  favorable	  versus	  non-­‐favorable	  industries	  across	  5%	  bins	  based	  on	  percentage	  sales	  from	  the	  favorable	  industry.	  From	  Table	  I,	  there	  is	  a	  clear	  U-­‐shaped	  pattern	  in	  conglomerate	  firm	  distributions	  (conglomerate	  firms	  are	  mainly	  dominated	  by	  one	  segment	  or	  the	  other,	  with	  relatively	  fewer	  that	  are	  near	  the	  50-­‐50	  cutoff).	  We	  see	  the	  same	  overall	  pattern	  for	  these	  favorable	  versus	  non-­‐favorable	  conglomerates,	  with	  one	  distinct	  difference:	  there	  is	  a	  large	  jump	  in	  the	  fraction	  of	  firms	  directly	  over	  the	  50%	  cutoff	  to	  qualify	  as	  a	  member	  of	  the	  favorable	  industry.	  The	  density	  difference	  at	  the	  50%	  cutoff	  (following	  the	  McCrary	  procedure)	  is	  0.254	  (t	  =	  2.59)	  compared	  to	  the	  preceding	  bin,	  a	  29%	  jump.14	  For	  comparison,	  if	  these	  firms	  are	  uniformly	  distributed	  in	  sales	  weights,	  the	  distribution	  density	  change	  between	  two	  consecutive	  bins	  should	  be	  exactly	  zero.	  For	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  distribution,	  there	  is	  no	  change	  in	  density	  nearly	  as	  large,	  and	  none	  are	  significant.	  This	  same	  result	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  Figure	  3.	  The	  top	  left	  panel	  shows	  the	  discontinuity	  at	  the	  50%	  cutoff	  of	  segment	  sales.15	  	  	  	  
3.5.3	  Falsification	  Tests:	  




we	  document	  is	  some	  odd	  empirical	  pattern	  in	  firm	  operations	  unrelated	  to	  firms	  actively	  assuring	  they	  are	  just	  above	  the	  sales	  discontinuity,	  we	  should	  expect	  to	  see	  similar	  patterns	  based	  on	  other	  accounting	  variables.	  	  To	  test	  this,	  we	  conduct	  the	  exact	  same	  sorts	  as	  in	  Table	  V,	  Panel	  A,	  with	  the	  same	  set	  of	  conglomerate	  firms,	  but	  instead	  of	  sorting	  on	  sales,	  we	  sort	  on	  other	  accounting	  variables,	  such	  as	  assets	  and	  profits.	  In	  other	  words,	  we	  rank	  these	  conglomerate	  firms	  by	  the	  percentage	  of	  profits	  (assets)	  they	  have	  in	  the	  favorable	  segment	  and	  show	  the	  entire	  distribution	  in	  Table	  III,	  Panel	  B	  (Panel	  C).	  From	  Panels	  B	  and	  C,	  we	  see	  no	  significant	  jumps	  between	  any	  two	  adjacent	  bins	  when	  sorting	  by	  these	  other	  firm	  variables,	  but	  rather	  a	  stable	  frequency	  in	  each	  of	  these	  bins.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  sales	  (the	  variable	  that	  drives	  industry	  classification)	  being	  the	  sole	  focus	  of	  firms.	  This	  lack	  of	  discontinuity	  when	  sorting	  by	  segment	  profits	  or	  assets	  can	  also	  be	  seen	  in	  the	  top	  right	  and	  bottom	  left	  panels	  of	  Figure	  3,	  respectively.	  	  	  These	  results,	  particularly	  those	  based	  on	  profits,	  also	  help	  rule	  out	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  of	  tournament	  behavior	  by	  divisional	  managers	  to	  be	  promoted	  to	  CEO.	  First,	  a	  nuanced	  version	  of	  the	  tournament	  explanation	  would	  be	  needed	  to	  differentially	  predict	  the	  desire	  (or	  ability)	  of	  managers	  in	  favorable	  industry	  segments	  to	  engage	  in	  this	  behavior	  relative	  to	  all	  other	  segment	  managers.	  Even	  if	  this	  were	  true,	  however,	  evidence	  shows	  that	  segment	  sales	  have	  no	  impact	  on	  the	  promotion	  of	  divisional	  managers	  (Cichello	  et	  al.,	  2009);	  profits	  are	  the	  only	  statistically	  and	  economically	  relevant	  predictor.	  However,	  we	  see	  no	  evidence	  of	  discontinuity	  when	  sorting	  on	  segment	  profits	  (or	  assets),	  but	  solely	  when	  sorting	  on	  firm	  sales.	  This	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  this	  tournament	  explanation,	  but	  consistent	  with	  the	  window	  dressing	  motive.	  	  	  
3.5.4	  Mechanism:	  




more	  in	  the	  favorable	  industry	  segment	  in	  order	  to	  be	  classified	  into	  favorable	  industries,	  and	  accrue	  the	  benefits	  we	  show	  in	  Section	  5.1.	  The	  second	  explanation	  is	  that	  firms	  are	  simply	  fraudulently	  reporting	  sales	  (on	  the	  margin)	  in	  order	  to	  be	  classified	  into	  the	  favorable	  industries.	  	  
3.5.5	  Window	  dressing	  through	  sales	  management:	  








cutoff	  of	  50%.	  To	  accommodate	  this,	  the	  signaling	  story	  would	  need	  to	  be	  combined	  with	  an	  investor	  cognitive	  constraint	  in	  which	  these	  investors	  pay	  attention	  only	  to	  firms	  that	  cross	  the	  50%	  threshold.	  Even	  if	  this	  combined	  story	  were	  true,	  we	  see	  no	  evidence	  that	  firms	  just	  above	  the	  50%	  cutoff	  are	  actually	  moving	  into	  these	  favorable	  segments.	  For	  instance,	  in	  the	  two	  to	  three	  years	  following	  the	  industry	  classification,	  we	  see	  no	  increase	  in	  investment,	  R&D,	  or	  sales	  in	  the	  favorable	  segment.	  This	  then	  reduces	  to	  a	  pseudo-­‐signaling	  story,	  which	  is	  nearly	  equivalent	  to	  the	  industry	  window	  dressing	  explanation.	  	  
3.5.6	  Window	  dressing	  through	  accounting	  manipulation:	  




restatements,	  as	  intuitively	  a	  firm	  that	  has	  moved	  from	  40%	  to	  80%	  sales	  in	  the	  favorable	  industry	  is	  less	  likely	  to	  have	  used	  accruals	  to	  do	  so	  than	  one	  that	  moved	  from	  49%	  to	  51%.	  Importantly,	  after	  controlling	  for	  (∆%SALESt-­‐1),	  the	  switch	  dummy	  now	  captures	  solely	  the	  effect	  of	  crossing	  the	  50%	  cutoff.	  Columns	  5	  and	  6	  then	  run	  the	  analysis	  for	  all	  other	  types	  of	  switchers	  (excluding	  non-­‐favorable	  to	  favorable	  industry	  switchers).	  These	  firms	  have	  are	  no	  more	  likely	  to	  restate	  earnings,	  with	  a	  small	  negative	  and	  insignificant	  difference	  between	  their	  likelihood	  and	  all	  other	  firms.	  The	  combination	  of	  results	  suggest	  that	  the	  positive	  coefficients	  of	  switching	  on	  restatement	  probabilities	  in	  Columns	  1	  and	  2	  are	  being	  driven	  entirely	  by	  those	  firms	  that	  are	  switching	  from	  non-­‐favorable	  to	  favorable	  industries.	  	  In	  sum,	  Tables	  VI–VIII	  suggest	  that	  while	  firms	  are	  manipulating	  sales	  in	  order	  to	  be	  classified	  into	  favorable	  industries:	  by	  slashing	  prices,	  which	  reduces	  profitability	  and	  inventories,	  we	  also	  find	  evidence	  that	  firms	  switching	  from	  non-­‐favorable	  to	  favorable	  industries	  are	  engaging	  in	  accounting	  manipulation	  to	  achieve	  that	  industry	  status.	  	  	  	  
3.5.7	  Benefits	  to	  Switching:	  	   Although	  we	  use	  the	  discontinuity	  approach	  throughout	  this	  paper	  to	  examine	  the	  behavior	  of	  firms	  to	  be	  classified	  into	  favorable	  industries,	  another	  sample	  of	  interest	  is	  firms	  that	  actively	  switch	  from	  non-­‐favorable	  to	  favorable	  industries.	  While	  these	  will	  include	  many	  of	  the	  same	  firms	  right	  above	  the	  discontinuity,	  they	  will	  also	  include	  firms	  that	  make	  larger	  changes	  in	  firm	  operations	  or	  shifts	  in	  focus	  (i.e.,	  mergers	  or	  dispositions	  of	  segments).	  We	  thus	  lose	  the	  identification	  of	  comparing	  two	  nearly	  identical	  firms	  right	  around	  the	  classification,	  since	  the	  decision	  to	  switch	  is	  not	  random.	  But	  we	  gain	  a	  group	  of	  firms	  that	  are	  acting	  decisively	  to	  move	  into	  the	  favorable	  segment.17	  	  








non-­‐favorable	  to	  a	  favorable	  industry	  in	  the	  current	  fiscal	  year,	  and	  zero	  otherwise.	  We	  also	  control	  for	  standardized	  unexpected	  earnings	  (SUE),	  defined	  as	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  consensus	  forecast	  and	  reported	  earnings	  scaled	  by	  lagged	  stock	  price,	  in	  the	  regression.	  Other	  control	  variables	  include	  firm	  size,	  the	  book-­‐to-­‐market	  ratio,	  lagged	  stock	  returns,	  share	  turnover,	  idiosyncratic	  volatility,	  institutional	  ownership,	  and	  number	  of	  analysts	  covering	  the	  firm.	  We	  also	  put	  in	  year-­‐fixed	  effects	  to	  subsume	  common	  shocks	  to	  all	  firms.	  	  The	  regression	  coefficients	  are	  reported	  in	  the	  last	  two	  columns	  of	  Table	  IX.	  In	  Column	  5,	  a	  firm	  that	  switches	  from	  a	  non-­‐favorable	  industry	  to	  a	  favorable	  industry	  has	  an	  announcement	  day	  return	  that	  is	  140	  basis	  points	  (t	  =	  2.38)	  higher	  than	  all	  other	  firms.	  In	  the	  full	  specification	  (Column	  2),	  where	  we	  control	  for	  other	  firm	  characteristics	  that	  are	  linked	  to	  average	  firm	  returns,	  firms	  that	  switch	  from	  non-­‐favorable	  to	  favorable	  industries	  outperform	  their	  peers	  by	  120	  basis	  points	  (t	  =	  2.08).	  	  	  An	  alternative	  method	  for	  running	  this	  announcement	  return	  effect	  is	  to	  focus	  solely	  on	  those	  firms	  in	  which	  there	  is	  investor	  uncertainty	  over	  industry	  classification	  (i.e.,	  firms	  that	  tightly	  surround	  the	  50%	  discontinuity,	  between	  45%	  and	  55%).	  When	  we	  run	  the	  identical	  announcement	  return	  test	  on	  this	  subsample,	  even	  though	  the	  sample	  is	  much	  smaller,	  the	  returns	  double	  in	  magnitude	  and	  are	  more	  significant.	  For	  example,	  the	  analog	  of	  Column	  6	  for	  this	  sample	  has	  announcement	  returns	  of	  260	  basis	  points	  (t=3.27).	  	  	  
3.5.8	  Regression	  Discontinuity	  (RD)	  vs.	  Discontinuity:	  




firms	  manipulating	  earnings	  to	  meet	  or	  barely	  beat	  (by	  zero	  or	  one	  penny)	  earnings	  expectations.	  	   Obviously,	  the	  potential	  issue	  is	  that	  the	  behavior	  of	  firms	  we	  document	  in	  Section	  5	  (firms	  selecting	  to	  be	  classified	  into	  favorable	  industries)	  violates	  the	  key	  assumption	  of	  regression	  discontinuity	  in	  Section	  4.	  	  To	  address	  this	  concern,	  we	  focus	  solely	  on	  the	  subsample	  of	  firms	  that	  operates	  entirely	  in	  non-­‐favorable	  sectors.	  These	  firms	  have	  no	  apparent	  incentive	  to	  select,	  and	  by	  construction,	  in	  this	  sample	  there	  can	  be	  no	  jump	  at	  any	  percentile,	  because	  the	  distribution	  is	  entirely	  symmetric	  –	  every	  (49%,	  51%)	  firm	  is	  also	  a	  (51%,	  49%)	  firm.	  This	  sample	  thus	  adheres	  to	  the	  regression	  discontinuity	  assumption	  of	  random	  assignment	  around	  the	  50%	  cutoff.	  We	  run	  our	  investor	  behavior	  tests	  on	  this	  subsample	  and	  see	  identical	  results	  to	  those	  reported	  in	  Section	  4.	  For	  instance,	  Table	  X	  Panel	  A	  shows	  the	  jump	  in	  industry	  beta	  at	  the	  50%	  cutoff	  for	  solely	  this	  subsample	  (analog	  to	  Table	  II).	  The	  average	  industry	  beta	  for	  firms	  in	  the	  50%–55%	  bin,	  after	  controlling	  for	  known	  risk	  factors,	  is	  0.219,	  whereas	  that	  in	  the	  45%–50%	  bin	  is	  0.143.	  The	  difference	  of	  0.076,	  representing	  a	  53%	  increase,	  is	  statistically	  significant	  (t	  =	  2.58).	  The	  difference	  in	  industry	  beta	  between	  any	  of	  the	  other	  two	  bins	  is	  statistically	  zero.	  	  	  
3.5.9	  Robustness	  Check:	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3.8	  Tables	  and	  Figures:	  
	  
Table I: Summary Statistics 
 
This table reports summary statistics of our sample that spans the period 1980-2010. Panel A 
reports the statistics of our main variable, mutual fund flows to each industry over a year, based 
on two-digit SIC codes. Specifically, at the end of each quarter, we compute a 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 measure as 
the aggregate flow-induced trading across all mutual funds in the previous year for each stock. 
We then take the average 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 across all stocks in each two-digit SIC code industry to derive 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊. Panels B and C report segment and firm specific characteristics. Profit margin is 
defined as the segment’s operating profit divided by segment sales. Both capital expenditures 
and R&D spending are scaled by total firm assets. Industry beta is from the regression of weekly 
stock returns on corresponding industry returns (excluding the stock in question) over a one-
year horizon, after controlling for the Carhart four-factor model. The announcement return is 
the 3-day cumulative return around an annual earnings announcement. Panel D reports the 
distribution of conglomerate firms year by year. We classify conglomerate firms into four 
groups, based on the relative sales of the top two segments. For example, a 10-20% 
conglomerate firm has one of the top two segments contributing between 10-20% of the 
combined sales and the other segment contributing 80-90% of the combined sales of the top 
two segments. We also report the number of conglomerate firms that switch their major 
industry classifications in each year. 
 
 
  Mean Std. Dev. Q1 Median Q3 
Panel A: Industry Characteristics 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 0.081 0.122 0.003 0.070 0.142 
      Panel B: Segment Characteristics 
Profit margin 0.076 0.145 0.023 0.081 0.150 
Segment sales (millions) 1103 5789 13 70 421 
Capital expenditures 0.024 0.027 0.005 0.013 0.032 
R&D Spending 0.004 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 
      Panel C: Firm Characteristics 
Industry beta 0.228 0.685 -0.151 0.184 0.593 
Announcement returns 0.007 0.083 -0.031 0.004 0.044 
      Panel D: Distribution of Conglomerate Firms Year by Year	  
# 10%-20% conglomerates 566 102 493 558 633 
# 20%-30% conglomerates 485 117 397 487 574 
# 30%-40% conglomerates 424 102 332 440 509 
# 40%-50% conglomerates 396 97 325 420 466 





Table II: Naive Industry Categorization: Industry Beta 
 
This table reports the average industry beta of conglomerate firms. At the end of each 
quarter, we compute an industry beta for each two-segment conglomerate firm with 
regard to each segment by regressing weekly stock returns on the weekly returns of the 
two-digit SIC code industry that the conglomerate firm operates in, using data from 
months 6 to 18 after the fiscal year end. We exclude the stock in question from 
calculating the corresponding industry returns. We also control for common risk factors, 
such as the market, size, value, and momentum in the regression specification. We focus 
on conglomerate firms that operate in exactly two industries (i.e., excluding firms with 
greater than or equal to three segments). All firms are then sorted into twenty 5% bins 
based on the sales from one of the two segments as a fraction of the combined sales. 
The first row reports the average industry beta with regard to the segment in question 
for all firms in each bin, the second and third rows report the difference in industry beta 
between the current bin and the preceding bin after controlling for year fixed effects, 
and the fourth and fifth rows report the same difference after controlling for year and 
industry fixed effects. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are based on standard errors 





















Industry Beta with Regard to the Segment in Question 
Industry beta 0.136 0.120 0.179 0.178 0.286 0.245 0.286 0.284 
betab - betab-1 -0.010 -0.020 0.055 0.003 0.107*** -0.033 0.043 -0.005 
(year) (-0.35) (-0.81) (1.23) (0.10) (4.91) (-0.85) (0.95) (-0.13) 
betab - betab-1 -0.013 -0.005 0.043 0.012 0.085*** -0.039 0.046 0.008 
(year + SIC) (-0.45) (-0.19) (0.93) (0.35) (3.86) (-0.92) (1.03) (0.20) 






Table III: Sector Mutual Fund Holdings and Analyst Coverage 
 
This table reports the proportion of sector mutual funds that hold (Panel A) and analysts 
that cover (Panel B) a conglomerate firm from each segment the firm operates in. At the 
end of each quarter, we assign a mutual fund holding more than ten stocks to a two-
digit SIC code industry, if that industry accounts for more than half of the fund’s 
portfolio value; similarly, we assign each sell-side analyst covering more than three firms 
to a two-digit SIC code industry, if that industry accounts for more than half of all the 
firms that the analyst covers. We exclude the conglomerate firm in question in the 
procedure of mutual fund/analyst industry assignments. We then compute the 
proportion of sector mutual funds holding and analysts covering the conglomerate firm 
from each industry that the conglomerate firm operates in using fund holdings and 
analyst coverage data in months 6 to 18 after the fiscal year end. We focus on 
conglomerate firms that operate in exactly two segments based on two-digit SIC codes; 
in addition, we require the two segments to operate in two distinct one-digit SIC code 
industries. All firms are then sorted into twenty 5% bins based on the sales from one of 
the two segments as a fraction of the combined sales. The first row of each panel 
reports the average proportion of sector mutual funds and analysts from the segment in 
question for all firms in each bin, the second and third rows report the difference in 
proportions between the current bin and the preceding bin after controlling for year 
fixed effects, and the fourth and fifth rows report the same difference after controlling 
for year and industry fixed effects. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are based on 
standard errors clustered at the year level. *, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 




















Panel A: Proportion of Sector Mutual Fund Holdings from the Segment in Question 
Sector mutual funds 0.176 0.235 0.219 0.231 0.328 0.334 0.354 0.362 
propb - propb-1 -0.005 0.050 -0.018 0.015 0.098** 0.010 0.034 -0.004 
(year) (-0.19) (1.54) (-0.48) (0.60) (2.55) (0.30) (1.10) (-0.15) 
propb - propb-1 -0.004 0.045 -0.020 0.005 0.081** 0.029 -0.005 -0.015 
(year + SIC) (-0.19) (1.60) (-1.12) (0.27) (2.35) (0.92) (-0.20) (-0.66) 
No. Obs. 402 381 309 295 295 309 381 402 
         
Panel B: Proportion of Analyst Coverage from the Segment in Question 
Analyst coverage 0.161 0.219 0.288 0.327 0.520 0.564 0.613 0.663 
propb - propb-1 0.018 0.057 0.070* 0.039 0.193** 0.044 0.049 0.050 
(year) (0.52) (1.32) (1.89) (0.70) (2.27) (0.80) (1.34) (1.00) 





Table IV: Mutual Fund Flows and Industry Valuation 
 
This table shows the effect of mutual fund flows on industry valuation. Panel A reports 
the calendar-time monthly returns to industry portfolios ranked by 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 . 
Specifically, at the end of each quarter, we compute a 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 measure for each stock as 
the aggregate flow-induced trading across all mutual funds in the previous year. We then 
take the average 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 across all stocks in each two-digit SIC code industry to derive 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊. We then sort all industries into decile portfolios based on 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 in each 
quarter and hold these decile portfolios for the next two years. To deal with overlapping 
portfolios in each holding month, we follow Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) to take the 
equal-weighted average return across portfolios formed in different quarters. Monthly 
portfolio returns with various risk adjustments are reported: the return in excess of the 
risk-free rate, CAPM alpha, and Fama-French three-factor alpha. T-statistics, shown in 
parentheses, are computed based on standard errors corrected for serial-dependence 
with 12 lags (Newey and West 1987). *, **, *** denote significance at the 90%, 95%, 
and 99% level, respectively.  
 
 
Panel A: Calendar-Time Portfolio Analysis 
Decile Excess 1-Factor 3-Factor Excess 1-Factor 3-Factor Excess 1-Factor 3-Factor 
  Return  Alpha Alpha Return  Alpha Alpha Return  Alpha Alpha 
 Formation Year Year 1 after Formation Year 2 after Formation 
1 1.01% 0.47% 0.25% 0.68% 0.14% 0.10% 1.02% 0.40% 0.19% 
(Low) (3.49) (3.45) (2.07) (2.40) (1.08) (0.92) (3.53) (2.73) (1.87) 
2 1.06% 0.51% 0.36% 0.88% 0.32% 0.15% 0.98% 0.33% 0.18% 
 (3.70) (4.09) (3.16) (3.04) (2.45) (1.37) (3.32) (2.37) (1.95) 
3 1.20% 0.66% 0.53% 0.67% 0.10% -0.08% 0.91% 0.26% 0.07% 
 (4.18) (5.04) (4.50) (2.26) (0.78) (-0.73) (3.07) (1.83) (0.74) 
4 1.28% 0.70% 0.58% 0.62% 0.07% -0.12% 0.98% 0.32% 0.14% 
 (4.23) (5.27) (5.01) (2.16) (0.56) (-1.24) (3.28) (2.33) (1.53) 
5 1.37% 0.81% 0.67% 0.55% 0.01% -0.18% 0.93% 0.29% 0.08% 
 (4.72) (6.74) (6.37) (1.96) (0.09) (-2.02) (3.20) (2.15) (0.89) 
6 1.53% 0.99% 0.84% 0.69% 0.16% 0.06% 0.65% 0.01% -0.16% 
 (5.35) (7.40) (8.62) (2.50) (1.33) (0.64) (2.28) (0.09) (-1.56) 
7 1.54% 1.02% 0.91% 0.48% -0.04% -0.17% 0.69% 0.10% -0.11% 
 (5.51) (7.22) (8.88) (1.75) (-0.30) (-1.55) (2.54) (0.74) (-1.05) 
8 1.68% 1.14% 1.10% 0.50% -0.03% 0.00% 0.42% -0.21% -0.29% 
 (5.58) (7.13) (9.34) (1.68) (-0.19) (-0.02) (1.47) (-1.56) (-2.23) 
9 1.76% 1.25% 1.25% 0.33% -0.20% -0.14% 0.41% -0.21% -0.26% 
 (5.79) (6.90) (8.52) (1.10) (-1.16) (-1.09) (1.36) (-1.27) (-1.50) 
10 2.03% 1.46% 1.40% 0.21% -0.37% -0.30% 0.41% -0.26% -0.31% 
(High) (6.26) (7.90) (9.30) (0.65) (-1.94) (-1.89) (1.27) (-1.55) (-1.79) 











Table IV: Mutual Fund Flows and Industry Valuation (Continued) 
 
This panel reports logit regressions of equity issuance and merger and acquisition 
activities of conglomerate firms. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is an 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒  dummy that takes the value of one if the firm increases shares 
outstanding (after adjusting for splits) by more than 10% in fiscal year 𝑡, and zero 
otherwise. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is a 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑  𝑀&𝐴 dummy 
that takes the value of one if the firm has at least one 100% stock-financed acquisition 
in fiscal year 𝑡  as reported in the SDC database, and zero otherwise; finally, the 
dependent variable in columns 5 and 6 is a 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ  𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑  𝑀&𝐴 dummy that takes the 
value of one if the firm has at least one 100% cash-financed acquisition in fiscal year 𝑡, 
and zero otherwise. The main independent variable is the industry flow (𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 ) 
measured in the previous year ( 𝑡 -1). Other control variables include the firm-level 
aggregate flow-induced trading in the previous year (𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊), firm size, book-to-market 
ratio, lagged one-year stock return, monthly share turnover, stock idiosyncratic 
volatility, and proportion of institutional ownership. Z-statistics, shown in parentheses, 
are based on standard errors that are clustered at the year level *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% level, respectively. 
 
 


















 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊!!! 1.419*** 1.451*** 2.383** 3.133*** -0.034 0.034 
 (3.07) (4.09) (2.29) (3.25) (-0.35) (0.48) 
       𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊!!!  0.346***  0.234***  0.096 
  (3.37)  (3.44)  (1.04) 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃!!!  -0.093***  0.317***  0.170*** 
  (-4.42)  (4.54)  (4.49) 𝐵𝑀!!!  -0.246***  -0.245**  -0.045 
  (-3.37)  (-2.06)  (-0.88) 𝑅𝐸𝑇12!!!  0.053*  0.176**  -0.164*** 
  (1.87)  (2.26)  (-2.77) 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅!!!  0.074***  0.085***  0.064*** 
  (5.01)  (5.69)  (4.45) 𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑂𝑉𝑂𝐿!!!  0.156***  0.169***  0.105 
  (4.42)  (4.76)  (0.32) 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑁!!!  0.015  -0.575**  0.946*** 
  (0.15)  (-2.32)  (4.42) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.00 0.04 






Table V: Discontinuity in Conglomerate Firm Distributions 
 
This table reports the distribution of conglomerate firms based on the relative weights of 
the top two segments. At the end of each quarter, we compute a 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 measure for 
each stock as the aggregate flow-induced trading across all mutual funds in the previous 
year. We then take the average 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊  across all stocks in each two-digit SIC code 
industry to derive 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊.  An industry is labeled as favorable in a year if it is one of 
the top 20 industries as ranked by 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 in that year. For each conglomerate firm in 
our sample, we require one of the top two segments to operate in a favorable industry 
and the other in a non-favorable industry. All firms are then sorted into twenty 5% bins 
based on the weight of the favorable segment as a fraction of the top two segments. In 
the first row of each panel, we report the frequency of observations in each 5% bin, 
calculated as the proportion of the conglomerate firms in the bin as a fraction of the 
total number of conglomerate firms between 10% and 90% of the ranking variable. The 
second row of each panel reports the difference in distribution density at the lower 
bound of the bin. The density differences, along with the T-statistics shown in brackets, 
are calculated using the methodology outlined in McCrary (2008). In panel A, firms are 
sorted into 5% bins based on sales from the favorable segment as a fraction of 
combined sales from the top two segments. For example, bin 50-55% contains all the 
conglomerate firms whose favorable segment accounts for 50-55% of the combined 
sales of the top two segments. In panels B and C, such grouping is done on the basis of 
segment profits and segment assets, respectively. *, **, *** denote significance at the 




















Panel A: Firms Sorted by %sales in the Favorable Segment 
Frequency 0.061 0.058 0.048 0.048 0.059 0.051 0.051 0.056 
Density difference -0.056 0.003 -0.056 0.080 0.254*** -0.156 0.056 0.117 
at the lower bound (-0.60) (0.04) (-0.52) (0.76) (2.59) (-1.62) (0.51) (1.18) 
No. Obs. 477 451 386 386 455 391 400 446 
         
Panel B: Firms Sorted by %profit in the Favorable Segment  
Frequency 0.059 0.057 0.056 0.052 0.058 0.055 0.055 0.056 
Density difference 0.019 -0.061 -0.082 -0.088 0.059 -0.120 -0.097 -0.018 
at the lower bound (-0.22) (-0.66) (-0.94) (-1.28) (0.65) (-1.31) (-1.14) (-0.19) 
No. Obs. 382 370 362 334 372 352 352 364 
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Panel C: Firms Sorted by %assets in the Favorable Segment 
Frequency 0.060 0.058 0.062 0.068 0.060 0.056 0.054 0.062 
Density difference -0.034 -0.047 0.087 0.103 -0.038 -0.083 -0.022 0.112 
at the lower bound (-0.29) (-0.38) (1.03) (1.24) (-0.33) (-0.71) (-0.18) (1.45) 







Table VI: Discontinuity in Segment Profit Margins  
 
This table reports segment profit margins of conglomerate firms. At the end of each 
quarter, we compute a 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 measure for each stock as the aggregate flow-induced 
trading across all mutual funds in the previous year. We then take the average 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 
across all stocks in each two-digit SIC code industry to derive 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊.  An industry is 
labelled as favorable in a year if it is one of the top 20 industries as ranked by 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 
in that year. For each conglomerate firm in our sample, we require one of the top two 
segments to operate in a favorable industry. All firms are then sorted into twenty 5% 
bins based on the sales from the favorable segment as a fraction of the combined sales 
from the top two segments. The first row of each panel reports the average 
characteristic of all firms in each bin, the second and third rows report the difference in 
that characteristic between the current bin and the two neighboring bins after 
controlling for year fixed effects, and the fourth and fifth rows report the same 
difference after controlling for year and industry fixed effects. Panels A and B report the 
average segment profit margin, defined as the segment’s operating profit divided by 
segment sales, in each bin. Panel C reports the average firm-level inventory growth rate 
between years 𝑡 and 𝑡-1 for all firms in each bin. We require that the conglomerate firm’s 
other top segment operates in a non-favorable industry. T-statistics, shown in 
parentheses, are based on standard errors clustered at the year level. *, **, *** denote 




















Panel A: Profit Margin in the Favorable Segment (Favorable vs. Non-favorable) 
Profit margin 0.104 0.101 0.100 0.104 0.081 0.099 0.094 0.101 
vs. neighbors 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.014 -0.021*** 0.013 -0.006 0.002 
(year) (0.18) (-0.21) (-0.24) (1.57) (-2.93) (1.71) (-0.74) (0.23) 
vs. neighbors 0.007 -0.007 0.000 0.014 -0.016*** 0.013 -0.010 0.006 
(year + SIC) (0.84) (-1.29) (0.00) (1.54) (-2.79) (1.61) (-1.25) (0.85) 
No. Obs. 385 350 303 298 342 290 285 339 
         
Panel B: Profit Margin in the Non-favorable Segment (Favorable vs. Non-favorable) 
Profit margin 0.099 0.091 0.085 0.089 0.087 0.094 0.088 0.091 
vs. neighbors 0.007 0.000 -0.003 0.002 0.002 0.000 -0.006 0.008 
(year) (0.91) (0.03) (-0.48) (0.31) (0.23) (-0.04) (-0.80) (1.11) 
vs. neighbors 0.008 -0.002 -0.003 0.004 0.001 0.000 -0.007 0.007 
(year + SIC) (1.04) (-0.38) (-0.39) (0.79) (0.09) (0.03) (-0.86) (0.88) 
No. Obs. 385 350 303 298 342 290 285 339 
 







Panel C: Inventory Growth Rates (Favorable vs. Non-favorable) 
Inventory growth 0.083 0.086 0.060 0.084 
vs. neighbors 0.000 0.014 -0.025** 0.004 
(year) (-0.01) (1.19) (-2.28) (0.24) 





Table VII: Segment Capital Expenditures and R&D Spending 
 
This table reports average segment capital expenditures and R&D spending of 
conglomerate firms. At the end of each quarter, we compute a 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 measure for each 
stock as the aggregate flow-induced trading across all mutual funds in the previous year. 
We then take the average 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 across all stocks in each two-digit SIC code industry to 
derive 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊.  An industry is labelled as favorable in a year if it is one of the top 20 
industries as ranked by 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊  in that year.  For each conglomerate firm in our 
sample, we require one of the top two segments to operate in a favorable industry and 
the other in a non-favorable industry. All firms are then sorted into twenty 5% bins 
based on the sales from the favorable segment as a fraction of the combined sales from 
the top two segments. The first row of each panel reports the average characteristic of 
all firms in each bin, the second and third rows report the difference in that 
characteristic between the current bin and the two neighboring bins after controlling for 
year fixed effects, while the fourth and fifth rows report the same difference after 
controlling for year and industry fixed effects. Panel A reports the average segment 
capex, defined as the segment capital expenditures divided by lagged firm total assets, 
in each bin. Panel B reports the average segment R&D, defined as the segment R&D 
spending divided by lagged firm total assets. T-statistics, shown in parentheses, are 
based on standard errors clustered at the year level. *, **, *** denote significance at the 




















Panel A: Capital Expenditures in the Favorable Segment (Favorable vs. Non-favorable) 
CapEx 0.019 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.022 0.026 0.029 0.031 
vs. neighbors 0.000 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 
(year) (0.18) (0.78) (0.83) (-0.84) (-0.68) (0.86) (0.15) (-0.11) 
vs. neighbors 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.002 0.002 -0.001 0.000 
(year + SIC) (0.48) (0.67) (-0.04) (-0.28) (-1.22) (1.25) (-0.25) (0.06) 












Panel B: R&D in the Favorable Segment (Favorable vs. Non-favorable) 
R&D 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 
vs. neighbors 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
(year) (1.12) (-1.20) (0.35) (-0.33) 
vs. neighbors 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
(year + SIC) (0.43) (-1.05) (0.27) (-0.22) 





Table VIII: Accounting Restatements 
 
This table reports logit regressions of accounting restatements on primary industry 
classification changes. The dependent variable in all columns is a dummy variable that 
takes the value one if there is an accounting restatement in the following year, and zero 
otherwise. The main independent variable is a 𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻 dummy that takes the value of 
one if the conglomerate firm’s main industry classification switches in the fiscal year, and 
zero otherwise. In columns 1 and 2, we include all switchers in our sample; in columns 3 
and 4, we only include switchers from a non-favorable to a favorable industry in the 
sample; finally, in columns 5 and 6, we include all the other switchers (i.e., those 
switching from non-favorable to non-favorable, from favorable to favorable, and from 
favorable to non-favorable industries) in the sample. We also control for the growth in 
the fraction of sales contributed by the favorable segment (∆%𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆). Other control 
variables include firm size, book-to-market ratio, lagged one-year stock return, monthly 
share turnover, stock idiosyncratic volatility, and proportion of institutional ownership. Z-
statistics, shown in parentheses, are based on standard errors that are clustered at the 
















 All Switchers Non-Favorable to Favorable Other Switchers 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻!!! 0.080 0.179* 0.285*** 0.382*** -0.093 -0.025 
 (0.86) (1.85) (2.93) (3.35) (-0.67) (-0.16) 
       ∆%𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆!!!	    -0.739**  -0.803***  -0.583 
	    (-1.99)  (-2.27)  (-1.30) 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃!!!  0.042  0.033  0.040 
  (0.86)  (0.66)  (0.85) 𝐵𝑀!!!  0.049  0.070  0.051 
  (0.67)  (1.01)  (0.70) 𝑅𝐸𝑇12!!!  -0.132  -0.131  -0.137 
  (-1.17)  (-1.12)  (-1.18) 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅!!!  0.076*  0.073*  0.076* 
  (1.80)  (1.74)  (1.78) 𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑂𝑉𝑂𝐿!!!  0.278***  0.278***  0.293*** 
  (5.63)  (5.45)  (5.82) 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑁!!!  3.192***  3.211***  3.264*** 
  (2.77)  (2.67)  (2.99) 
       
Pseudo R2 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.09 






Table IX: Benefits to Industry “Window Dressing” 
 
This table reports regressions of earnings announcement day returns, and SEO and M&A 
activities on primary industry classification changes. The dependent variable in columns 
1 and 2 is an 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦  𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 dummy that takes the value of one if the firm increases 
shares outstanding (after adjusting for splits) by more than 10% in the fiscal year, and 
zero otherwise; the dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is a 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑑  𝑀&𝐴 
dummy that takes the value of one if the firm has at least one 100% stock-financed 
acquisition in fiscal year 𝑡  as reported in the SDC database; finally, the dependent 
variable in columns 5 and 6 is the cumulative 3-day return around an annual earnings 
announcement. The main independent variable is a 𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻 dummy that take the value 
of one if the conglomerate firm’s main industry classification switches from a non-
favorable to a favorable industry in the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. We also control 
for the growth in the fraction of sales contributed by the favorable segment (∆%𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆). 
Other control variables include the standardize unexpected earnings (𝑆𝑈𝐸), defined as 
the difference between the actual earnings and consensus analyst forecast scaled by 
lagged stock price, firm size, book-to-market ratio, lagged one-year stock return, 
monthly share turnover, stock idiosyncratic volatility, and proportion of institutional 
ownership. Year-fixed effects are included in columns 5 and 6. T-statistics and Z-
statistics, shown in parentheses, are based on standard errors that are clustered at the 


















 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 𝑆𝑊𝐼𝑇𝐶𝐻!!! 0.475*** 0.414*** 1.150*** 1.260*** 0.014** 0.012** 
 (4.45) (3.90) (3.77) (3.35) (2.38) (2.08) 
       𝑆𝑈𝐸!     0.199*** 0.240*** 
     (5.47) (5.02) ∆%𝑆𝐴𝐿𝐸𝑆!!!	    -0.142  -1.573  0.006 
	    (-0.47)  (-1.39)  (0.42) 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝐶𝐴𝑃!!!  -0.075***  0.242***  -0.001 
  (-4.24)  (2.71)  (-1.25) 𝐵𝑀!!!  -0.222***  -0.063  0.001 
  (-3.61)  (-0.17)  (0.39) 𝑅𝐸𝑇12!!!  0.072  0.106  -0.005 
  (1.23)  (0.86)  (-1.63) 𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐸𝑅!!!  0.075*  0.030*  0.000 
  (1.70)  (1.81)  (0.23) 𝐼𝐷𝐼𝑂𝑉𝑂𝐿!!!  0.158***  0.196***  -0.065 
  (3.09)  (3.88)  (-0.34) 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑂𝑊𝑁!!!  -0.151  0.324  0.011** 
  (-0.88)  (0.45)  (2.21) 
       Adj./Pseudo R2 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.03 






Table X: Robustness Checks 
 
This table reports some robustness checks. At the end of each quarter, we compute a 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 measure for each stock as the aggregate flow-induced trading across all mutual 
funds in the previous year. We then take the average 𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 across all stocks in each 
two-digit SIC code industry to derive 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊.  An industry is labelled as favorable in a 
year if it is one of the top 20 industries as ranked by 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 in that year. All firms are 
then sorted into twenty 5% bins based on the weight of the favorable segment as a 
fraction of the top two segments. Panel A reports the discontinuity in industry beta for a 
subsample of firms that operate in two non-favorable industries. The first row reports 
the average industry beta with regard to the segment in question, and the second row 
reports the difference in industry beta between the current bin and the preceding bin. 
Panels B and C report the distribution of conglomerate firms whose top two segments 
are in one favorable industry and one non-favorable industry. In the first row of either 
panel, we report the frequency of observations in each 5% bin. The second row reports 
the difference in distribution density at the lower bound of the bin. The density 
differences, along with the T-statistics shown in brackets, are calculated using the 
methodology outlined in McCrary (2008). In panel B, we include only two-segment firms 
in the sample (that is, we exclude all firms with more than two segments). In Panel C, an 
industry is labelled as favorable if it is one of the top 20 industries as ranked by the 
industry market-to-book ratio in that year (following the M/B industry decomposition in 
Rhodes–Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005). *, **, *** denote significance at the 




















Panel A: Industry Beta (non-favorable vs. non-favorable) 
Industry beta 0.131 0.132 0.115 0.143 0.219 0.185 0.193 0.264 
betab - betab-1 0.016 -0.002 -0.020 0.022 0.076*** -0.027 0.007 0.066 




















Panel B: Discontinuity in Distribution, Two Segment Firms Only 
Frequency 0.059 0.054 0.046 0.044 0.053 0.047 0.050 0.052 
Density difference 0.074 -0.061 0.027 0.142 0.267** -0.198 -0.043 0.171 
at the lower bound (0.63) (-0.48) (0.20) (0.99) (2.01) (-1.62) (-0.28) (1.28) 
No. Obs. 277 250 223 212 256 223 241 250 
         
Panel C: Discontinuity in Distribution, Industries Ranked by M/B 
Frequency 0.056 0.053 0.050 0.049 0.060 0.059 0.059 0.062 
Density difference 0.102 0.055 0.020 -0.073 0.242** 0.031 -0.058 0.110 
at the lower bound (1.07) (0.58) (0.21) (-0.74) (2.54) (0.35) (-0.53) (1.23) 










Figure 1: This figure shows the average industry beta and proportion of sector mutual 
funds that hold and analyst that cover the firm from each segment a conglomerate firm 
operates in. We focus only on conglomerate firms that operate in two two-digit SIC code 
industries. All firms are then sorted into twenty 5% bins based on the sales from one of 
the two segments as a fraction of the combined sales. The blue circles represent the 
average characteristics of all firms in each bin, while the red curves represent the 
smoothed estimated linear functions that fit over these observations. The top left panel 
shows the average industry beta. Specifically, at the end of each quarter, we compute 
an industry beta for each conglomerate firm in our sample by regressing weekly stock 
returns on the weekly returns of the two-digit SIC code industry that the conglomerate 
firm operates in, using data from months 6 to 18 after the fiscal year end. We exclude 
the stock in question from calculating the corresponding industry returns. The bottom 
two panels report the proportion of sector mutual funds that hold and analysts that 
cover the firm from each segment, respectively. Specifically, at the end of each quarter, 
we assign a mutual fund holding more than ten stocks to a two-digit SIC code industry, if 
that industry accounts for more than half of the fund’s portfolio value; similarly, we 
assign each sell-side analyst covering more than four firms to a two-digit SIC code 
industry, if that industry accounts for more than half of all the firms that the analyst 
covers, using coverage data in the previous three years. We exclude the stock in 
question in industry assignments to ensure that our results are not mechanical. We then 




conglomerate firm operates in using fund holdings and analyst coverage data in months 









Figure 2: This figure shows the distribution of conglomerate firms based on relative sales 
weights of the top two segments. For each conglomerate firm in our sample, we require 
one of the top two segments to operate in a favorable industry and the other in a non-
favorable industry, where an industry is labelled as favorable in a year if it is one of the 
top 20 industries as ranked by 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊  in that year. Since the larger of the two 
segments determines the industry classification of the conglomerate firm, the 50% point 
in relative sales is the discontinuity point in our empirical analysis. The grey area shows 
the distribution of conglomerate firms whose sales from favorable industries account for 
40%-60% of the total sales, while the block area shows the distribution of conglomerate 
firms whose sales from favorable industries account for 45%-55% of the total sales. Any 
firm over the 50% point in this figure is classified to a favorable industry, whereas any 











Figure 3:  This figure shows the smoothed density functions based on the relative 
weights of the top two segments of conglomerate firms. The estimation methodology is 
outlined in McCrary (2008). The blue circles represent the distribution density of each 
bin grouped by the sorting variable. The red curves are the estimated smoothed density 
functions, and the 2.5% to 97.5% confidence intervals of the estimated density. Both 
the bins size and bandwidth are chosen optimally using the automatic selection criterion. 
The densities to the left and right of the discontinuity point (the 50% cut-off in our 
case) are then estimated using local linear regressions. For each conglomerate firm in our 
sample, we require one of the top two segments to operate in a favorable industry and 
the other in a non-favorable industry. In the first three panels, an industry is labelled as 
favorable in a year if it is one of the top 20 industries as ranked by 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 in that 
year. In the last panel, an industry is labelled as favorable if it is one of the top 20 
industries as ranked by the industry book-to-market ratio in that year (following the B/M 
industry decomposition in Rhodes–Kropf, Robinson, and Viswanathan, 2005). In the top 
left and bottom right panels, firms are ranked based on sales from the favorable 
segment as a fraction of combined sales from the top two segments. In the top right 
and bottom left panels, such grouping is done on the basis of segment profits and 










Figure 4: This figure shows various financial/accounting characteristics of conglomerate 
firms. For each conglomerate firm in our sample, we require one of the top two 
segments to operate in a favorable industry and the other to operate in a non-favorable 
industry. An industry is labelled as favorable in a year if it is one of the top 20 industries 
as ranked by 𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐹𝐿𝑂𝑊 in that year. All firms are then sorted into twenty 5% bins based 
on the sales from the favorable segment as a fraction of the combined sales from the 
top two segments. The blue circles represent the average characteristics of all firms in 
each bin, while the red curves represent the smoothed estimated polynomial functions 
(up to three degrees) that fit over these observations. The top left panel shows the 
average profit margin in the favorable segment, defined as the segment’s operating 
profit divided by segment sales, in each bin. The top right panel shows the average 
profit margin in the non-favorable segment. The bottom left panel shows the average 
capex in the favorable segment, defined as the segment capital expenditures divided by 
lagged firm assets, in each bin, and the bottom right panel shows the average R&D in the 
favorable segment, defined as the segment R&D spending divided by lagged firm assets. 
 
	  
